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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT PERMITS RECOVERY OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
ONLY UPON SHOWING OF EMPLOYER'S OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT
IN VIOLATING THE ACT
Dreyer v. Arco Chemical Co. (1986)
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),I like Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 shields individuals from adverse em-
ployment actions based on the individual's membership in a protected
class. 3 Both statutes also provide for the recovery of backpay should a
1. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81
Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982)). For an
explanation of earlier attempts at federal age discrimination legislation, see
McKenry, Enforcement of Age Discrimination in Employment Legislation, 32 HASTINGS
L.J. 1157 (1981).
In 1964, prior to the passage of the ADEA, President Johnson issued an
executive order prohibiting age discrimination in employment under federal
contracts. See Exec. Order No. 11,141, 3 C.F.R. 491 (1961-1981). In addition, it
had been urged during the debate prior to enactment of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 that the aged be included as a protected group under Title
VII. See 110 CONG. REC. 2596-98 (1964) (remarks of Reps. Pucinski, Dowdy,
Sikes, and Colmer). It was believed, however, that age discrimination posed
different problems than those present in discrimination based on race, sex, reli-
gion or national origin. See id. at 2599 (remarks of Rep. Goodell). Instead, Con-
gress directed the Secretary of Labor to report on the special problems of age
discrimination. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON AGE DiS-
CRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1964 (1965).
For a general discussion of how the ADEA differs from Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, see Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90
HARV. L. REV. 380 (1976).
2. Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253(1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982)) [hereinaf-
ter Civil Rights Act of 1964]. The central provision of Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
3. The ADEA provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or other-
wise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
(855)
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plaintiff prevail in a civil action against an employer. 4 Unlike Title VII,
however, the ADEA provides for the recovery of liquidated damages in
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's age ....
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982). In order to be in the class protected by the ADEA,
the individual must be at least 40 but less than 70 years of age. Id. § 631(a)
(1982).
4. The ADEA provides for two primary enforcement mechanisms. Under
29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982) the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) may bring suit on behalf of an individual for injunctive and monetary
relief, or an individual may bring a civil action for such legal or equitable relief
"as will effectuate the purposes of [the ADEA]." Id. § 626(c)(1). However, the
right to individual suit terminates upon commencement of an action by the
EEOC. Id.
The EEOC was created by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 (1982). Under the Act, the Commission was empowered to
prevent the unlawful employment practices covered by Title VII. Id. § 2000e-5.
In 1978, enforcement power under the ADEA was transferred from the Secre-
tary of Labor to the EEOC. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amend-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (1978). For a discussion of the
impact of the transfer on the enforcement of the ADEA, see McKenry, supra note
1.
The ADEA provides:
No civil action may be commenced by an individual . . . until 60
days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with
the [EEOC]....
Upon receiving such a charge, the [EEOC] shall promptly notify all
persons named in such charge as prospective defendants in the action
and shall promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by
informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion....
For the period during which the [EEOC] is attempting to effect
voluntary compliance with requirements of [the Act] through informal
methods.., the statute of limitations.., shall be tolled, but in no event
for a period in excess of one year.
29 U.S.C. § 626(d)-(e) (1982).
Unlike cases brought under Title VII, however, the ADEA does not require
that a plaintiff receive a notice of right to sue before commencing suit. See B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 494 (2d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter SCHLEI & GROSSMAN]. For a further discussion of procedure and
remedies under the ADEA, see generally id. at 487-97, 520-32; Richards, Mone-
tary Awards for Age Discrimination in Employment, 30 ARK. L. REV. 305 (1976); Com-
ment, Age Discrimination: Monetary Damages Under the Federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 58 NEB. L. REV. 214 (1978) [hereinafter Comment, Age Discrimi-
nation]; Comment, Procedural Aspects of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 36 U. P'rr. L. REV. 914 (1975); Note, Damage Remedies Under the Age Discrim-
ination Employment Act, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 47 (1976) [hereinafter Note, Damage
Remedies]; Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: Available Federal Relief, 11
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 281 (1975). See also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575
(1978) (contrasting remedies under Title VII and ADEA).
While the scope of this casebrief is limited to age discrimination employer
practices, it should be noted that the ADEA also applies to employment agencies
and labor organizations. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(b), (c) (1982).
2
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cases of willful5 violations of the Act.6 The issue of what conduct consti-
tutes a willful violation of the ADEA was recently addressed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Dreyer v. ARCO
Chemical Co. 7
Prior to its decision in Dreyer, the Third Circuit had held that proof
that the defendant had "discharged the employee because of age and
that the discharge was voluntary and not accidental, mistaken, or inad-
vertent,"18 was sufficient to establish a willful violation of the ADEA.
The standard adopted by the Third Circuit in Burroughs was called into
question after the Supreme Court's decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc.
5. Although the ADEA specifically provides that "liquidated damages shall
be payable only in cases of willful violations" of the Act, there is no statutory
definition of willfulness. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). Further, "the legislative
history of the ADEA is silent on this point." Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 713 F.2d 940, 956 (2d Cir. 1983).
Some guidance may be found in other areas of the law. For example, a
finding of willfulness in the context of tort law is permitted where "the actor has
intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known
or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would
follow. See W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS 213 (5th ed.
1984).
In addition, both civil and criminal statutes contain and define the "willful-
ness" standard. For a discussion of this standard in both contexts, see Com-
ment, The Standard of Willfulness for Liquidated Damages Under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 32 EMORY L.J. 583, 586-88 (1983).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). Liquidated damages are defined by reference
to §§ 16 and 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219, 557 (1982). Such damages are an additional amount equal to the
employee's unpaid minimum wages, or unpaid overtime compensation, as the
case may be. Id. § 216(b) (1982).
The ADEA has been described as a hybrid of Title VII and the FLSA in that
"the prohibitions in the ADEA generally follow Title VII, but the remedies are
those of the FLSA." SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 485.
7. 801 F.2d 651 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1348 (1987). For a
discussion of the facts in Dreyer, see infra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
8. Wehr v. Burroughs, 619 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1980). Burroughs in-
volved a discharged 44 year-old engineer who believed he had been a victim of
age discrimination by the Burroughs Corporation because of the company's ex-
pressed desire to replace some older employees with " 'young tigers.' " Id. at
278. The court found that "Congress did not intend to restrict the meaning of
'willful' . . . to intentional violations of the ADEA." Id. at 283.
The Third Circuit upheld the standard adopted in Burroughs as recently as
1984. See McDowell v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., 740 F.2d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 1984),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1202 (1985). In McDowell, a dis-
charged employee of Avtex Fibers, Inc. brought an age discrimination claim
under the ADEA. Id. at 214. The Third Circuit affirmed the trial court's finding
of a willful violation of the ADEA. Id. at 215. The court further held that the
trial court properly applied the Burroughs standard in finding the violation. Id. at
218. Since the lower court " '[flound no basis for concluding that the plaintiff's
discharge was not voluntary [or] that it was accidental, mistaken or inadver-
tent,' " the Third Circuit upheld the finding of "willfulness" under the Burroughs
formulation. Id. at 219 (quoting Mem. Op. at 8, reprinted in App. 14) (emphasis
supplied by Third Circuit).
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v. Thurston.9 In Thurston, the United States Supreme Court held that the
liquidated damages provision of the Act must be interpreted in a way
that would not permit "an award of double damages in almost every
case," '0 as would necessarily be the result under the Burroughs rule. I I
The Court stated that "[t]he legislative history of the ADEA indicates
that Congress intended for liquidated damages to be punitive in
nature." 12
Following the Supreme Court's holding in Thurston, the Third Cir-
cuit, in Dreyer, held that, in addition to the employer's knowledge that its
conduct violated the ADEA when it terminated an employee because of
age,' 3 "there must be some additional evidence of outrageous conduct"
on the employer's part to warrant recovery of liquidated damages. 14 Ac-
9. 469 U.S. 111 (1985). For a discussion of the facts of Thurston, see infra
note 31.
10. Id. at 128.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 125; see also Smith & Leggette, Recent Issues in Litigation Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 41 OHIo ST. L.J. 349, 368-69 (1980) (liqui-
dated damages under ADEA intended as substitute for punitive damages); Note,
Damage Remedies, supra note 4, at 68-80 (same). But see C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER &
C. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 779
(1980) (liquidated damages under ADEA not intended as punitive).
Note, however, that neither punitive damages nor damages for emotional
distress or pain and suffering are generally recoverable under the ADEA. See,
e.g., Smith v. Office of Personnel Management, 778 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1949 (1986) (no damages for pain and suffering); Fariss v.
Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1985) (punitive damages disal-
lowed); Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984) (damages for emo-
tional distress not recoverable); Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731
F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1984) (neither punitive nor emotional distress damages al-
lowed); Hill v. Spiegel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1983) (no damages for pain
and suffering); Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1982) (neither
damages for pain and suffering, nor punitive damages recoverable); Pfeiffer v.
Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1039
(1982) (same); Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806 (8th Cir.
1982) (damages for pain and suffering not permitted); Naton v. Bank of Califor-
nia, 649 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); Murphy v. American Motors Sales
Corp., 570 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1978) (punitive damages not recoverable); Rodri-
guez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978)
(no damages for psychic distress); Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d
1036 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978) (no damages for pain and
suffering or punitive damages); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550
F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978) (no damages for pain
and suffering or emotional distress).
13. The court stated that "[w]here an employer makes a decision such as
termination of an employee because of age, the employer will or should have
known that the conduct violated the [ADEA]." Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 658. The
court reasoned that " '[a]s employers are required to post ADEA notices, it
would be virtually impossible for an employer to show that he was unaware of
the Act and its potential applicability.' " Id. at 656 (quoting Thurston, 469 U.S. at
128).
14. Id. at 658. The court relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
suggested that it serve as a guide in assessing punitive damages. Id. at 657-58.
858
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cording to the Third Circuit, liquidated damages must "be based on evi-
dence that does not merely duplicate that needed for the compensatory
damages."15
Dorothy Dreyer was a sixty year old computer operator in the Fi-
nancial Controls Department of ARCO Chemical Company 16 who had
worked in ARCO's Beaver Valley plant since 1959.17 During a corpo-
rate reorganization in 1981 and 1982, ARCO consolidated the subunits
of one of its divisions, reducing the size of its work force at the Beaver
Valley plant and affecting the Financial Controls Department. 8 As a
result of the reorganization, Dreyer's job was eliminated and a new posi-
tion created which consolidated the duties of computer operator and
data entry. 19 The plant's data entry supervisor, who was thirty-eight
years of age, was chosen to fill the new position, and Dreyer was termi-
nated. 20 Dreyer filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, 2 1 claiming that her termination vio-
lated the ADEA and that the termination was intentional and willful.2 2
Specifically, the court stated that " 'the trier of fact can properly consider [inter
alia] the character of the defendant's act, [and] the nature and extent of the
harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause.' " Id. at
658 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1977)). As to what
would constitute sufficient additional evidence supporting a finding of a willful
violation, see infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
15. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 658. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's
holding in Dreyer, see infra notes 30-57.
16. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 655. Dreyer and another plaintiff, Naomi Strayer, a
56 year-old secretary to the manager of the Financial Controls Department, filed
suit together, claiming that their dismissal violated the ADEA. Id. at 653-54.
Although the jury returned a verdict for both plaintiffs, only Dreyer was awarded
statutory liquidated damages. Id. at 654. Because the focus of this casebrief
concerns the Third Circuit's discussion of the liquidated damages issue, the de-
tails of Strayer's claim are not discussed.
17. Id. at 655.
18. Id. at 652. The Financial Controls Department was reduced from 26 to
18 employees. Id.
19. Id. at 655.
20. Id. Dreyer had been offered the opportunity to voluntarily retire under
a special retirement plan applicable to employees over the age of 55. Id. at 652-
53. She rejected the offer and, after her termination, accepted early retirement
under protest. Id. at 653. This issue was rendered moot, however, as ARCO did
not contend that her acceptance of the early retirement benefits precluded her
from exercising her rights under the ADEA. Id.
21. Id. at 653.
22. Id. In an age discrimination case alleging individual disparate treat-
ment on the basis of circumstantial evidence, the burdens of production and
proof are governed by the United States Supreme Court's decision in McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas, the
Supreme Court set forth a three-part scheme for allocating the burden of pro-
duction in Title VII cases. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 653. This scheme was first applied
by the Third Circuit in Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir. 1980). Id.
For a further discussion of the McDonnell Douglas scheme, see SCHLEI & GROSS-
MAN, supra note 4, at 13-15, 497-502.
As the Dreyer court explained the McDonnell Douglas formulation, the plaintiff
5
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Based on the parties' stipulation as to damages, the jury returned a ver-
dict for Dreyer in the amount of $68,367.75.23 In addition, the jury
found Dreyer's discharge to have been malicious and awarded her statu-
tory liquidated damages in the amount of her backpay.
24
ARCO's principal argument on appeal to the Third Circuit 25 was
that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a finding
that it had violated the ADEA in discharging Dreyer and Strayer.
26
ARCO's secondary argument, however, is of particular interest. 2 7 Spe-
must first prove a prima facie case. 801 F.2d at 653. The plaintiff must demon-
strate that he: "(1) was discharged; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) was
within the protected class at the time of discharge; [and] (4) was replaced by
someone outside the protected class, or ... by someone younger, or ... show
otherwise that his discharge was because of his age". Id. at 654.
The burden of production then "shifts to the defendant to articulate a legit-
imate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's discharge." Id. at 653. For
example, while the plaintiff may allege that he was terminated on account of his
age, he may inf act have been dismissed due to unsatisfactory work performance.
"If the employer meets this burden, the plaintiff must [then] show that the
articulated reason is a pretext for a discrimination. Id. Notwithstanding the
shifting burden of production, the plaintiff at all times "bears the ultimate burden
of proving that age was 'a determinative factor' in the decision" to terminate. Id.
(citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981);
Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984). See also Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA. L. REV.
621 (1983).
At trial, ARCO's articulated legitimate reason for dismissal was that ARCO
officials, in deciding who should fill the new combined position of computer op-
erator and data entry, had compared Dreyer's qualifications with those of the 38
year-old data entry supervisor and concluded that the latter was better qualified
to fill the new position. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 655. Dreyer's argument at trial re-
garding pretext was based "on the theory that once her job was eliminated, she
should have been given either the new job .. .or another comparable job for
which she was qualified." Id. She challenged ARCO's evidence that she was less
qualified than the 38 year-old and attacked the evaluation process, producing
evidence that her 1981 performance evaluation had been made by the same 38
year-old woman. Id. "Dreyer also stressed that she had not been offered any
other available position although there were jobs in the restructured Financial
Controls Department for which was was qualified and which she had filled in the
past." Id. For example, two payroll clerk jobs were given to younger women,
aged 27 and 40, who had little or no experience in those jobs. Id. Additionally,
women significantly younger than Dreyer were given positions in data entry. Id.
23. Id. at 653. This amount represented Dreyer's backpay. Id.
24. Id. Thus, Dreyer's total award was $136,725.50. Id. Dreyer's co-plain-
tiff, Strayer, recovered $66,043.99 in backpay. Id. However, Strayer was not
awarded liquidated damages. Id.
25. ARCO's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a
new trial were denied by the district court. Id.
26. Id. Specifically, ARCO argued that it had demonstrated to the trial
court, legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for discharging the two plaintiffs.
Id. ARCO argued that plaintiffs had failed to prove that ARCO's decision to
terminate plaintiffs' employment was pretextual and that one of the plaintiffs,
Strayer, had not even established a prima facie case of age discrimination. Id.
27. With regard to ARCO's principal argument on appeal, the Third Cir-
860
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cifically, ARCO argued that the evidence presented at trial was insuffi-
cient to meet the requisite standard of willfulness under the ADEA, a
standard, according to ARCO, that had to comply with the holding of
Thurston.28
In attempting to articulate the standard for a finding of willfulness
under the ADEA, Judge Sloviter, writing for a unanimous court,2 9 re-
viewed the Burroughs standard for finding a willful violation, i.e., that
" '[i1t is sufficient' to prove that the company discharged the employee
because of age and that the discharge was voluntary and not accidental,
mistaken, or inadvertent."'30 In light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Thurston, however, the court found it necessary to reevaluate the Bur-
roughs standard.3 ' In so doing, the Third Circuit first noted the Court's
cuit found that plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence such that "a jury...
could have concluded that Strayer's and Dreyer's age ... played a part in
ARCO's selection of them for termination." Id. at 654-56.
For a review of the evidence presented by both Dreyer and ARCO, see supra
note 22. The court stated that "[g]iven this evidence, we cannot overturn the
jury's verdict that age was a factor in Dreyer's termination." Dreyer, 801 F.2d at
655. In sum, the court stated:
[B]oth Dreyer and Strayer presented primafacie cases of age discrimina-
tion. ARCO presented evidence from which a jury could conclude that
it retired the plaintiffs for reasons other than age. Much of the evi-
dence before the jury required its evaluation of the credibility of the
witnesses. Plaintiffs introduced evidence to show pretext. The jury
chose to accept plaintiffs' evidence that the asserted reasons were
pretextual.
Id. at 655-56 (emphasis added).
28. Appellant's Brief at 39-40, Dreyer v. ARCO Chem. Co., 801 F.2d 651
(3d Cir. 1986) (No. 85-3476).
29. The case was argued before Judges Sloviter, Stapleton and District
Judge Longobardi, sitting by designation. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 652.
30. Id. at 657 (quoting Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283 (3d
Cir. 1980)) (citations omitted). The Burroughs court went on to state that "it
would also be sufficient to prove that the discharge was precipitated in reckless
disregard of consequences." 619 F.2d at 283. For a further discussion of Bur-
roughs, see supra note 8.
31. 469 U.S. 111 (1985). In Thurston, TWA, concerned that its retirement
policy regarding flight engineers violated the ADEA prohibitions against
mandatory retirement because of age, adopted a plan permitting an employee
with " 'flight engineer status' " at age 60 to continue working in that capacity.
Id. at 115. However, the plan did not give 60 year-old captains the right to begin
training automatically as flight engineers. Id. at 116. Instead, a captain could
remain with TWA only if he were able to obtain flight engineer status through
bidding procedures outlined in the collective bargaining agreement between
TWA and the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA). Id. These procedures re-
quired a captain to submit a " 'standing bid' " for the position of flight engineer
prior to his 60th birthday. Id. When a vacancy occurred, it was to be assigned to
the most senior captain with a standing bid. Id. If no vacancy occurred prior to
his 60th birthday, or if the captain lacked sufficient seniority to bid successfully
for the vacancies that did occur, the captain was retired. Id.
However, under the collective bargaining agreement, a captain displaced
for any reason other than age did not have to resort to the bidding procedures.
Id. The Court noted:
1987]
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emphasis that " '[t]he legislative history of the ADEA indicates that Con-
gress intended for liquidated damages to be punitive in nature.' "32 The
court then quoted the standard held by the Thurston Court to be accepta-
ble, 3 3 noting that under Thurston, conduct is willful if" 'the employer...
knew or showed reckless disregard for ... whether its conduct was pro-
hibited by the ADEA.' ",34
For example, a captain unable to maintain the requisite first-class medi-
cal certificate [required for the position of captain] may displace auto-
matically, or "bump," a less senior flight engineer. The medically
disabled captain's ability to bump does not depend on the availability of
a vacancy. Similarly, a captain whose position is eliminated due to re-
duced manpower needs can "bump" a less senior flight engineer. Even
if a captain is found to be incompetent to serve in that capacity, he is
not discharged, but is allowed to transfer to a position as flight engi-
neer without resort to the bidding procedures.
Id. at 116-17 (footnotes omitted).
The Court held that TWA's transfer policy discriminated against protected
individuals on the basis of age, and thus violated the ADEA, concluding that the
discriminatory transfer policy "permits the forced retirement of captains on the
basis of age." Id. at 124-25.
32. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 656 (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,
469 U.S. at 125). The original ADEA bill incorporated § 16(a) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, which imposes criminal liability for a willful violation. See 113
CONG. REC. 2199 (1967) (remarks of Sen.Javits); see also Comment, supra note 5,
at 596-99. However, citing the difficult problems of proof that would arise
under a criminal provision and the possibility that an employer's invocation of
the fifth amendment might impede investigation, conciliation and enforcement,
SenatorJavits proposed that the criminal penalty in cases of willful violation be
eliminated and double damage liability in a civil action be substituted. 113
CONG. REC. 7076 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
33. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 656.
34. Id. (quoting Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128). The Thurston Court held, how-
ever, that TWA's conduct was not a willful violation because it had adopted its
transfer policy only after having conferred with its attorneys and with the ALPA
in an attempt to bring its retirement policy in line with the ADEA and to comply
with its collective bargaining agreement. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 129-30.
In adopting the "knew or showed reckless disregard" standard, the Thurston
Court rejected the argument that an employer's conduct is willful if the em-
ployer is " 'cognizant of an appreciable possibility that the employees involved
[are] covered by the [ADEA].' " Id. at 127. Similarly, the Court rejected the
view of some courts that a willful violation will be found simply where the em-
ployer knows that the ADEA is " 'in the picture'." Id. at 127-28.
The "in the picture" standard of willfulness was originally developed in
connection with determining whether the two-year statute of limitations for
ADEA violations or the three-year statute of limitations for willful ADEA viola-
tions applied in a particular case. Section 6 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947
(PPA), which is incorporated in both the ADEA and the FLSA, provides for a
two-year statute of limitations period unless the violation is willful, in which case
the limitations period is extended to three years. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1982); see
also Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139, 1142 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972); Comment, supra note 5, at 588-96 (analyzing the
requirement of "wilfulness" in the FLSA and ADEA statute of limitations
provisions).
The "in the picture" standard was then extended by the Fifth and Tenth
Circuits to apply to the definition of willfulness for the purpose of assessing
8
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The Third Circuit noted that "many cases since Thurston have ex-
liquidated damages. See Hedrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088, 1096 (5th Cir.
1981); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 595 (10th Cir. 1980). Under this
standard, however, because employers are required to post ADEA notices, the
employee's burden of proving employer knowledge of the Act's application is
easily met. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 156 n.10 (7th
Cir. 1981). An award of liquidated damages will thus be virtually automatic, a
result both courts and commentators have found to be contrary to congressional
intent. See id. at 154-55; Comment, supra note 5, at 606 ("in the picture" stan-
dard inconsistent with statutory language of ADEA damages provision).
In addition to the "in the picture" standard, there were, prior to Thurston,
roughly three other standards utilized by the courts to find willful violations of
the ADEA. See Note, Liquidated Damages and Statute of Limitations Under the "Will-
ful" Standard of the Fair Labor Standard Act and Age Discrimination in Employment Act:
Repercussions of Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 516,
531-36 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Liquidated Damages]. These three standards
have been categorized as follows: 1) If the employer intended to violate the
ADEA, the court will find a willful violation of the Act. See, e.g. Loeb v. Textron,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1008, 1020 n.27 (1st Cir. 1979); 2) If the employer knew or
should have known that its actions violated the Act, liquidated damages will be
awarded. See, e.g., Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 155-56
(7th Cir. 1981); Spagnulo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1114 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974,
980 (9th Cir. 1981); 3) If the employer acted with reckless disregard of the con-
sequences of its actions, a willful violation of the ADEA will be found. See, e.g.,
Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1184 (6th Cir. 1983); Goodman v.
Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 1981); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619
F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1980).
For a thorough discussion of these various standards, see Note, Liquidated
Damages, supra, at 531-36. For additional discussion of the different standards,
see Syvock v. Milwaukee Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 154-56 (7th Cir. 1981). See also
Richards, supra note 4, at 327-36; Comment, supra note 5, at 603-16; Comment,
Age Discrimination, supra note 4, at 229-34; Note, The Meaning of "Willful" Under the
Liquidated Damages Provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 68 IOWA L.
REV. 333, 340-48 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Meaning of "Willful']; Note, Damage
Remedies, supra note 4, at 76-80.
In rejecting the "in the picture" standard, the Thurston Court noted that
such a standard would allow the recovery of liquidated damages even if the em-
ployer acted reasonably and in good faith. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128 n.22. The
Court explained that the FLSA, as originally enacted, was interpreted as al-
lowing liquidated damages any time there was a violation of the Act. Id. Accord-
ing to the Thurston Court, Congress' enactment of the PPA reflected its
dissatisfaction with that harsh interpretation. Id. Section 11 of the PPA provides
the employer with a defense to a mandatory award of liquidated damages if it
can show good faith and reasonable grounds for believing it was not in violation
of the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1982); see also Note, Liquidated Damages, supra,
at 522-23 (discussing whether good faith test should be subjective or objective).
While the Thurston Court noted that section 7(b) of the ADEA does not incorpo-
rate section 11 of the PPA, it stated that, "[n]evertheless, we think that the same
concerns are reflected in the proviso to § 7(b) of the ADEA." 469 U.S. at 128
n.22. The Court further stated that Congress could not have intended to permit
the recovery of liquidated damages if the employer acted reasonably and in good
faith. Id.; see also Note, Meaning of "Willful," supra, at 337 (determining appropri-
ate definition of willful requires consideration of availability of good faith de-
fense; they "are interdependent issues that must be resolved in concert."). But
see Elliott v. Group Medical & Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 558 n.2 (5th Cir.
1983) (trial court has discretion to determine amount, if any, of liquidated dam-
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tracted from it the 'dual knew or showed reckless disregard' test of will-
fulness to all claimed violations of the ADEA." '3 5 However, the court
reasoned that this test was not required in all age discrimination cases.
ages), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984); Hedrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d
1088, 1096 (5th Cir. 1981) (trial judge has discretion to reduce award of liqui-
dated damages on showing of good faith); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d
588 (10th Cir. 1980) (same); Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307 (5th
Cir. 1976) (same). See generally Comment, supra note 5, at 599-603.
Under Thurston, courts may take into account the employer's good faith
upon a finding of willfulness. See, e.g., Whitfield v. City of Knoxville, 756 F.2d
455 (6th Cir. 1985). However, the question remains whether the good faith de-
fense is even necessary. Because the FLSA, unlike the ADEA, did not contem-
plate two levels of culpability, liquidated damages, as the Thurston Court pointed
out, were recoverable for every violation of the Act, 469 U.S. at 128 n.22. Its
apparent dissatisfaction with this interpretation of the FLSA prompted Congress
to enact the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947. Id. (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.
575, 581-82, n.8 (1978)). Section 11 of the PPA provides the employer with a
good faith defense to a mandatory award of liquidated damages. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 260 (1982). While the ADEA does not incorporate this section of the PPA, it is
clear that the ADEA does provide for its own two-tiered liability scheme. See id.
§ 626(b) (providing for liquidated damages only in cases of willful violations of
ADEA).
Prior to Thurston, most courts took the view that section 11 of the PPA was
not incorported into the ADEA. Consequently, courts held that either a good
faith defense would not be available to the employer, or the employer's good
faith would be irrelevant upon a finding of willfulness. See, e.g., Rose v. National
Cash Register Corp., 703 F.2d 225 (6th Cir.) (good faith defense not available to
employer), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939 (1983); Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696
F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1983) (employer's good faith does not necessarily preclude
liquidated damages); Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1981)
(good faith defense not available to employer); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619
F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1980) (same); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir.
1979) (court need not make finding as to employer's good faith); see also Rich-
ards, supra note 4, at 327-31 (Section 11 of PPA not applicable to ADEA).
35. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 656 (emphasis added). For a discussion of these
cases, see infra note 76. It should be noted that the "knew or showed reckless
disregard" standard set forth in Thurston has not been universally well-received.
One district court called it "senseless," stating:
Under what circumstances can an act of 'intentional' discrimination be
other than the product of willfulness? It is only another example of
how trial courts are expected to rationally apply what appear to be irra-
tional standards. I would hold the liquidated damages provisions, as
applied to age discrimination cases, to be unconstitutional as denying
due process because of vagueness and indefiniteness.
Spanier v. Morrison's Management Serv., 611 F. Supp. 642, 646 (N.D. Ala.
1985), aff'd in part and revd in part, 822 F.2d 975 (11 th Cir. 1987).
However, while intentional discrimination, if evidence of such is presented,
will constitute willfulness, this would appear to be the correct result. Not all
violations will be deemed willful, however, under the Thurston standard. For a
further discussion of the question of how effectively the Thurston standard distin-
guishes willful from non-willful cases, see infra notes 76-85 and accompanying
text. See also Richards, supra note 4, at 333 (pre-Thurston commentary advocating
knowledge or reckless disregard standard); Comment, supra note 5, at 617-18
(same); Note Meaning of "Willful," supra note 34, at 357 (same). But see Com-
ment, Age Discrimination, supra note 4, at 234 (advocating low threshold knowl-
edge requirement with requirement that employer must have acted in bad faith).
864
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According to the Third Circuit, a distinction must be made between
cases involving the adoption of a policy that allegedly violates the ADEA
("policy" cases), and those cases involving employer decisions directed
at individual employees ("individual" cases). 3 6
According to the Dreyer court, while the "knew or showed reckless
disregard" standard is "particularly apt" 37 where an employer policy is
involved,3 8 the "standard is not easily incorporated in cases alleging dis-
parate treatment in a discrete employment situation."139 "Because the
36. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 656. While it may seem more convenient to refer to
"policy" cases as disparate impact cases, and to "individual" cases as disparate
treatment cases, that terminology would be inexact. Disparate treatment refers
to situations involving either discrete employment situations or an employer pol-
icy evidencing an intent to discriminate. In these situations, the plaintiff must
prove an intent to discriminate, although as an alternative to presenting direct
evidence of intent to discriminate, the plaintiff may rely on indirect evidence
under the McDonnell Douglas three-part scheme described supra, at note 22. See
SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 13-15.
A plaintiff in a disparate impact case will normally be challenging a facially
neutral employer policy that has the effect of discriminating against a protected
group; here, intent to discriminate is irrelevant. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 162-64, 191-
92. Because a discriminatory, though facially neutral employer policy may be
found to be either willful or not, depending on whether the employer showed
reckless disregard for whether the policy violated the ADEA, and thus could fall
into either category, use of the term "disparate impact" seems imprecise in the
context of willful ADEA violations. Likewise, because disparate treatment can
refer both to discrete employment decisions and employer policy situations, the
term will be avoided.
For a discussion of the problems in applying the Title VII disparate impact
theory to age discrimination cases, see SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 503-
04 and cases cited therein. See also Player, Title VII Impact Analysis Applied to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act: Is a Transplant Appropriate?, 14 U. TOL. L. REv.
1261 (1983) (discussing propriety of using Title VII disparate impact analysis in
ADEA cases).
37. 801 F.2d at 656.
38. As an example of employer "policy" case, the Third Circuit cited Whit-
field v. City of Knoxville, 756 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1985). In Whitfield, the City of
Knoxville notified 23 policemen and 33 firemen that they were to be involunta-
rily retired in light of budget shortfalls. Id. at 458. This notification was made
pursuant to a City Charter provision authorizing the involuntary retirement of
firemen and policemen with 25 years of service who had reached the age of 50.
Id. Following Thurston, the court adopted the "knew or showed reckless disre-
gard" standard, but found that because it was unclear at that time whether the
ADEA applied to state and local governments, the City did not have actual
knowledge that the involuntary retirement provision violated the ADEA. Id. at
463-64. Further, the court found that the City's reliance on several district court
decisions was "reasonable as a matter of law" and thus, did not constitute reck-
lessness. Id. at 464. The appellate court also noted the district court's finding
that the defendants had acted in good faith. Id. For a discussion of the issue of
good faith in this context, see supra note 34. It is now settled that the ADEA
does apply to state and local governments. See Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
39. 801 F.2d at 656. This is to be distinguished from the "policy" cases, in
which "it is meaningful to inquire whether the employer knew that the action
11
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'willful' inquiry arises only after the employer has been found to be lia-
ble under the ADEA, the fact-finder would already have found that the
employer used age as a 'determinative' factor in the employment deci-
sion."14 0 Thus, the danger arises that use of the standard in connection
with a discrete employment decision made on the basis of age would in
effect allow the recovery of liquidated damages any time there was an
ADEA violation.4 1 Because the Court in Thurston clearly rejected such a
result, the Third Circuit concluded that it "must interpret the liquidated
damages provision in a way that would not permit 'an award of double
damages in almost every case.' "42 The court then sought to define "a
standard for willfulness that distinguishes between a violation, which is
almost always intentional, and a willful violation, leading to [liquidated]
damages."
43
Noting that Congress intended for liquidated damages to be puni-
tive in nature,4 4 the Third Circuit turned to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts in an effort to develop the proper standard. 45 Specifically, the
court noted that the Restatement provides that "[p]unitive damages are
damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded
against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him
and others like him from similar conduct in the future."' 46 Therefore,
was in violation of the Act or whether it acted in reckless disregard of the
prohibitions of the ADEA." Id.
40. Id. at 657.
41. Id. " 'As employers are required to post ADEA notices, it would be vir-
tually impossible for an employer to show that he was unaware of the Act and its
potential applicability.' " Id. at 656 (quoting Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128). The
Dreyer court pointed out that in Thurston, the Supreme Court rejected the "liqui-
dated damages in every case" interpretation. Id. at 657 (citing Thurston, 469 U.S.
at 128 n.22). Thus, in an "individual" case, the "knew" prong of the test will
almost always be satisfied. Id. at 656. Therefore, the Dreyer court concluded that
"[flor similar reasons, an inquiry into 'reckless disregard', which is an alternate
to 'knew', would also not be meaningful to most disparate treatment claims." Id.
at 656-57.
42. Id. at 657 (quoting Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128). The Court in Thurston
stated that "[b]oth the legislative history and the structure of the statute show
that Congress intended a two-tiered liability scheme." 469 U.S. at 128. The
Dreyer court further stated that "we must interpret the liquidated damages provi-
sion in a manner that effectuates this intent." 801 F.2d at 657 (citation omitted).
43. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 657.
44. Id. at 657 (quoting Thurston, 469 US. at 125); see also supra note 12.
Compare this intention with the purpose of liquidated damages under the FLSA,
which are intended as compensatory rather than punitive. Overnight Motor
Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 593 (1942); Heiar v. Crawford County,
Wis., 746 F.2d 1190, 1202 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985);
Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Marshall v. Brunner,
668 F.2d 748, 753 (3d Cir. 1982). Such damages are intended to compensate an
employee for any losses suffered as a result of the wrongful retention of his pay.
Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945).
45. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 657.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977) (emphasis added).
While approving of this formulation, the court rejected the "general standard
866 [Vol. 32: p. 855
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the court reasoned, the essence of punitive damages is that "they may be
awarded 'for conduct that is outrageous.' ",47
The Third Circuit thus held that " '[w]here an employer makes a
decision such as termination of an employee because of age, . . .' liqui-
dated damages [must] be based on evidence that does not merely dupli-
cate that needed for compensatory damages."'4 8 As the employer will or
should have known that the conduct violated the ADEA, 49 there must be
some additional evidence of outrageous conduct.50
The court then listed several kinds of evidence that would warrant a
finding of willfulness, such as a previous violation of the ADEA, 5 1 the
termination of an employee at a time that would deprive the employee
of an imminent pension, 52 or a systematic purge of older people from
for punitive damages," which "encompasses an inquiry into 'defendant's evil
motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.' " Dreyer, 801 F.2d at
657 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1977)). The court also
noted that the "need to show 'evil motive or bad purpose' as an element of
willfulness" was expressly disclaimed by the Supreme Court. Id. (citing Thurston,
469 U.S. at 126 n.19).
47. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 657 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 908(2) (1977)) (emphasis supplied by the court).
48. Id. at 658.
49. Id. For a discussion of the "knew or showed reckless disregard" stan-
dard enunciated in Thurston, see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
50. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 658. The court noted that, in assessing punitive
damages, the fact-finder could properly consider the character of the defend-
ant's act and the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff. Id. (citing RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2)). The court adopted the "outrageous
conduct" standard after examining previous Third Circuit cases concerning pu-
nitive damages. Id. at 657-58. For example, in Berroyer v. Hertz, the court relied
on comment b to section 908(2) of the Restatement which provides:
Since the purpose of punitive damages is not compensation of the
plaintiff but punishment of the defendant and deterrence, these dam-
ages can be awarded only for conduct for which this remedy is appro-
priate-which is to say, conduct involving some element of outrage similar to
that usually found in crime.
672 F.2d 334, 340 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 908(2) comment b (1977)) (emphasis supplied by the court). Similarly, in
Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., the criterion for awarding punitive damages in the
context of strict liability was declared to be "outrageous" or similar conduct.
717 F.2d 828, 841 (3d Cir. 1983). Finally, in Zippertubingv. Teleflex, Inc., the court
stated that, in cases of intentional conduct, the award of punitive damages rests
on whether there was evidence of malice. 757 F.2d 1401, 1413 (3d Cir. 1985).
In Zippertubing, the Third Circuit stated that " '[slomething more than the mere
commission of the tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be
circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or 'malice' " Id. (quoting
Grillo v. Board of Realtors, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 232, 219 A.2d 635, 652 (Ch. Div.
1966)).
51. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 658. Such a previous violation "might warrant impo-
sition of liquidated damages to effectuate the deterrent purpose underlying the
willfulness provision." Id.
52. Id. Such employer action "might show the 'outrageousness' of conduct
that would warrant double damages." Id.
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the employee staff.53 However, in most cases, the court stated, "as is
true of punitive damages generally, the appropriateness of the award
will be dependent upon an ad hoc inquiry into the particular
circumstances." 5
4
Applying the standard developed by the court to the facts of the
case before it, the Third Circuit concluded that the evidence produced
by Dreyer fell short of the minimum evidence needed to support a find-
ing of willfulness under the ADEA.5 5 Nor were there any other aggra-
vating factors warranting punitive damages. 56 While there was evidence
that ARCO failed to appoint Dreyer to other available jobs filled by
younger employees, the court concluded that such evidence demon-
strated at most a violation of the ADEA, "but not the outrageous con-
duct needed to distinguish a violation from willful action." 5 7
It is submitted that the Third Circuit's approach in Dreyer has certain
merits of a practical nature. Preliminarily, the court set forth a standard
for measuring the propriety of liquidated damages in the "individual"
category of age discrimination cases that is less susceptible to widely
divergent interpretations, i.e., above and beyond the evidence of em-
53. Id. Here, "[t]he circumstances of the violation itself may be so egre-
gious . . .that double damages might be warranted to effectuate the punitive
aspect of the willful section." Id. The court noted that the list was not intended
to be exclusive. "We cannot," the court stated, "provide a litany of situations
that would warrant a factfinder in finding willfulness." Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. Because Dreyer failed to produce the "'minimum quantum'" re-
quired to support a finding of willfulness, she was not entitled to liquidated
damages. Id. As was noted by the court, "ARCO was undeniably in the process
of restructuring and reducing the employee personnel of the plant and the Fi-
nancial Controls Department in which [Dreyer] worked," and Dreyer "[did] not
contend that elimination of her job was a pretext to terminate her." Id. There-
fore, the court concluded that the evidence did not support the conclusion that
"Dreyer's discharge was part of a pattern of conduct to involuntarily terminate
personnel in the protected group." Id. This conclusion was reached despite
Dreyer's demonstration that ARCO had done an " 'age analysis' " of its em-
ployee population. Id. Specifically, Dreyer compared the ages of employees in
the Financial Controls Department before and after the reorganization. Id. The
court, however, noted that the majority of the older employees in the depart-
ment had voluntarily accepted early retirement. Id. Therefore, Dreyer's evi-
dence failed to establish a pattern of involuntary terminations, according to the
court. Id. For a summary of the evidence presented by Dreyer and ARCO, see
supra notes 16-22.
56. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 658. Presumably, the court would find that evidence
of employer conduct such as that discussed supra at notes 47-49 would constitute
"aggravating circumstances." For example, if ARCO had previously violated the
ADEA or if Dreyer's termination had deprived her of an imminent pension, the
court may have found ARCO's conduct to have been "willful."
57. Id. at 658-59. The Third Circuit thus affirmed the order of the district
court denying ARCO's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict with
respect to the jury's finding of liability of Strayer and Dreyer and the award of
damages. Id. at 659. However, the district court's order was reversed insofar as
it upheld the jury finding of willfulness and the award of double damages to
Dreyer. Id.
14
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ployer conduct required simply to prove a violation of the Act, there
must be additional evidence of outrageous conduct such as to justify
punitive damages. 5 8 Moreover, the two-tiered standard promulgated in
Dreyer is in accord with the Supreme Court's express desire that there
not be liquidated damages in almost every case,5 9 and the Court's find-
ing that the legislative history and structure of the statute show that
Congress indeed intended a two-tiered liability scheme.60 As a result,
while employers must certainly continue to disregard age as a factor in
making individual employment decisions, they may be assured that
double damages will likely be the exception rather than the rule, awarda-
ble only upon a showing of serious misconduct. 6 1 In sum, under Dreyer,
it is no longer sufficient for a plaintiff to show merely that the dismissal
was "voluntary." ,62
Nevertheless, while the result in Dreyer appears sound and even de-
sirable from a practical standpoint, the reasoning and approach of the
court warrant the following observations. First, neither the statute itself
nor the Supreme Court's holding in Thurston indicate that Congress rec-
ognized a distinction between "policy" cases and "individual" cases in
formulating a standard for imposing liquidated damages. 6 3 Second, in
establishing this distinction, the Third Circuit has substituted the statu-
tory standard with a common law punitive damages standard 64 -outra-
geousness-a standard which is divorced not only from the language of
the ADEA, but also from Thurston's express holding that a violation of
the ADEA is willful if the employer either knew or showed reckless dis-
regard for whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA.6 5 Finally,
the distinction made by the court in Dreyer between "policy" and "indi-
58. Id. at 658. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis in reaching
this standard, see supra notes 30-50 and accompanying text.
59. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128.
60. Id. The Thurston Court "declirie[d] to interpret the liquidated damages
provision of [the ADEA] in a manner that frustrates this intent." Id.
61. For some examples of outrageous conduct warranting the award of liq-
uidated damages, see supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. Although these
examples were not intended by the Dreyer court to be all-inclusive, the nature of
the conduct involved in each example suggests that the "routine" ADEA case
would not involve such conduct.
62. The "voluntary" standard is most closely associated with the Third Cir-
cuit's decision in Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276 (1980). In Burroughs,
the Third Circuit held that, in order to prove "willfulness" under the ADEA, it
was sufficient to prove that the discharge of the employee was "voluntary and
not accidental, mistaken, or inadvertent." Id. at 283. For a further discussion of
the Burroughs standard, see supra notes 8 & 30 and accompanying text.
63. For a discusison of the difference between "policy" and "individual"
cases, see supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
64. The Dreyer court relied on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908
in arriving at its "outrageousness" standard. 801 F.2d at 657.
65. Thurston. 469 U.S. at 128.
1987] 869
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vidual" cases is a needless one on both policy and practical grounds. 66
With regard to the first point, there is no language anywhere in the
ADEA suggesting that a distinction should be made between "policy"
and "individual" cases. 6 7 In addition, section 7(b), which also contains
the "willful" provision, speaks only of "violations" of the Act, without
reference to the existence of different kinds of violations. 68 Nor did the
Court in Thurston make reference to the possible application of a sepa-
rate "willful" standard to policy cases as distinguished from individual
cases. 69 Indeed, the Third Circuit did not rely on language in either the
statute or Thurston in creating this distinction. The court simply de-
clared the distinction, 70 and explained the "danger" of using the "knew
or showed reckless disregard" standard in individual cases. 71
As to the second point, the Third Circuit's perceived need for such
a distinction has led it away from the task of interpreting the statute, and
into the realm of judicially creating a new standard for liquidated dam-
ages, when in fact one already exists in the statute. In construing section
7(b) of the ADEA, the inquiry should be whether the employer's con-
duct was "willful," a fact clearly recognized by the Third Circuit in Bur-
roughs when it stated: "The starting point in any case is to ascertain the
degree of culpability intended by Congress when using 'willful.' "72 But
in Dreyer, the Third Circuit relied solely on the Supreme Court's restate-
ment of the legislative history emphasizing that liquidated damages were
66. For a discussion of why the distinction made by the court is unneces-
sary, see infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
67. See generally Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
634 (1982).
68. Id. § 626(b) ("[L]iquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of
willful violations of this Act.").
69. The Court spoke only of "violations." See Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128-29.
70. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 656. For a further discussion of the court's reason-
ing on this point, see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
71. The "danger" of using the Thurston "knew or showed reckless disre-
gard" standard for discrete employment situations, according to the court in
Dreyer, is that such a standard would "in effect allow the recovery of liquidated
damages any time there was a violation of the Act." Id. at 657. The court was
quick to point out that such a result was inconsistent with the Thurston Court's
interpretation of congressional intent. Id.
72. Burroughs, 619 F.2d at 282. The Burroughs court relied on a Florida dis-
trict court case which defined "willful" as encompassing those " 'violations
which are intentional, knowing or voluntary as distinguished from accidental.' "
619 F.2d at 282-83 (quoting Hodgson v. Hyatt, 318 F. Supp. 390, 392-93 (N.D.
Fla. 1970)). This was essentially the same formulation adopted in Burroughs. For
a discusison of the Burroughs standard, see supra notes 8 & 30 and accompanying
text.
Although Hodgson involved the definition of "willful" under the FLSA, the
Burroughs court noted that section 6(a) of the PPA which extends the statute of
limitations for willful violations of the FLSA from two years to three years, is
specifically incorporated into section 7(e) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(1)
(1982). Burroughs, 619 F.2d at 282-83.
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intended to be punitive in nature. 7 3 The court then concentrated not on
defining "willful," but rather on establishing a standard for awarding
punitive damages, concluding that "outrageous conduct" is required.74
It would be easy to understand, if not approve, such judicial disre-
gard for the language of a statute if indeed there was a "danger" that
failing to distinguish between policy and individual ADEA cases would
inappropriately result in liquidated damages in virtually all individual
cases under the "knew or showed reckless disregard" standard of Thur-
ston. 75 It is submitted, however, that the "danger" has been grossly
overstated and that neither policy nor practicality justify such a
distinction.
The Third Circuit, in Dreyer, the only circuit to have done so, 76 dis-
tinguished individual from policy cases and set forth a new standard-
outrageousness-for determining willfulness in individual ADEA cases.
The court was concerned that use of the Thurston "knew or showed reck-
less disregard" standard in these cases would frustrate the congressional
intent to establish a two-tiered liability scheme, and in the court's view,
allow the recovery of liquidated damages any time there was a violation
of the Act.7 7 However, it is clear that the "knew or showed reckless
disregard" test functions just as effectively in individual, as in policy
cases, in distinguishing willful violations from other violations of the
ADEA. Moreover, such a standard fosters greater care on the part of
employers in their dealings with protected employees.
The Third Circuit stated in Dreyer that because the willful inquiry
73. For a discussion of this aspect of the Dreyer opinion, see supra note 44
and accompanying text.
74. For a discussion of this aspect of the Dreyer opinion, see supra notes 46
and 47 and accompanying text.
75. This perceived "danger" forms the basis for the distinction made by the
court between "policy" and "individual" age discrimination cases. See Dreyer,
801 F.2d at 656-57.
76. To date, several federal courts have adopted the "knew or showed reck-
less disregard" standard, but none has distinguished "policy" from "individual"
cases. See, e.g., Smith v. Consolidated Mut. Water Co., 787 F.2d 1441, 1443
(10th Cir. 1986); Archambault v. United Computing Sys., Inc., 786 F.2d 1507,
1513-14 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Wilhelm v. Blue Bell, Inc., 773 F.2d 1429, 1435 (4th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1199 (1986); Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n v. Wyoming Retirement Sys., 771 F.2d 1425, 1431 (10th Cir. 1985);
Gilkerson v. Toastmaster, Inc., 770 F.2d 133, 137 (8th Cir. 1985); Williams v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 770 F.2d 47, 50 (6th Cir. 1985); Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166,
1174-75 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985); Grohs v. Gold Bond Bldg.
Prods., 627 F. Supp. 1555, 1556-57 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Armsey v. Nestle Co., 631
F. Supp. 717, 722-23 (S.D. Ohio 1985); Nordquist v. Uddeholm Corp., 615 F.
Supp. 1191, 1204-05 (D. Conn. 1985). But see Real v. Continental Group, Inc.,
627 F. Supp. 434, 444 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (recognizing distinction between policy
and individual cases, but nevertheless holding that reckless disregard standard
in Thurston is properly applied in individual case). Id.
77. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's reasoning in this regard, see
supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
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arises only after the employer has been found to have used age as a
determinative factor in the employment decision, and the employer will
have known of the requirements of the ADEA, willfulness will be found
in virtually all individual cases. 78 However, on policy grounds, this is as
it should be. It is quite clear that if the employer knew that (or, under
the Thurston definition, showed reckless disregard for the question of
whether) the strictures of the ADEA applied to a particular employment
decision, but nevertheless chose to make that decision with age as a de-
terminative factor, the employer acted willfully.79 It is not at all clear
why the Third Circuit felt compelled to further insulate the employer
from double liability by adding an additional hurdle to a willfulness find-
ing. The court's approach in this instance appears oriented more to-
ward reaching a desired result than in fulfilling the wishes of Congress
and the Supreme Court. It appears that the Dreyer court sympathized
with ARCO for its lack of outrageous or offensive conduct with respect
to Dreyer's discharge, and was reluctant to "punish" ARCO by requir-
ing the company to pay liquidated damages. The court may have been
swayed by ARCO's assertion that the terminations of Dreyer and Strayer
were simply the result of "some dedicated people making tough deci-
sions during tough times." 8 0 Nevertheless, ARCO surely knew (or if it
did not, was reckless in not knowing) of the ADEA's prohibitions and
that Dreyer was protected under the Act, and was found to have used
age as a determinative factor in Dreyer's discharge. Therefore, ARCO's
discharge of Dreyer was certainly willful under the Thurston standard.
ARCO's policy should have been to review all employment decisions to
ensure that age was not a factor in the thinking of those who made those
decisions. Even if a court later found that age was a determinative factor
in the employment decision, appropriate documentation of the decision-
making process would show a reasonable effort to comply with the
ADEA, and not recklessness. Such conduct by ARCO would seem to
effectively insulate it from double liability.8 1
Further, even if the "knew or showed reckless disregard" standard
resulted in findings of willfulness in all individual cases, it could never-
theless be argued that Congress intended all cases in this class to fall
within the willful category of the two-tiered scheme. Nonetheless, it is
submitted that just as the "knew or showed reckless disregard" test ef-
fectively weeds out the willful from the non-willful policy cases, so also
does it serve to differentiate between those individual cases where a will-
78. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 656-57. For a discussion of this aspect of the court's
opinion, see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
79. For a discussion of the traditional tort definition of willful, see supra
note 5.
80. Appellant's Brief at 43, Dreyer v. ARCO Chem. Co., 801 F.2d 651 (3d
Cir. 1986) (No. 85-3476).
81. See Thurston, 469 U.S. at 129-30 (describing steps taken by TWA to en-
sure compliance with the ADEA).
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fulness finding is appropriate, and those where it is not. Just as there
will be cases in the policy category where the employer did not know or
show reckless disregard for whether its actions were prohibited by the
ADEA, there will be individual cases where the same is true, illustrating
the lack of practical necessity in the Third Circuit's distinction.
In the policy category of cases, Thurston itself presents an example
of circumstances where the employer violated the ADEA but did not
know or show reckless disregard for whether it had committed the viola-
tion.8 2 Having consulted counsel regarding its new transfer policy,
there was "no indication that TWA was ever advised by counsel that its
• . .policy discriminated against captains on the basis of age."'8 3 Thus,
TWA did not know that its conduct violated the ADEA. As to reckless
disregard, the Court found that TWA might simply have overlooked the
discriminatory aspect of the new plan in focusing on the larger overall
problem, i.e., bringing its retirement policy into compliance with new
provisions of the ADEA while simultaneously observing the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement.84
Similarly, there are situations in the individual category of cases
where, though the employer's conduct might be found by a jury to have
violated the ADEA, the employer would not be found to have known or
shown reckless disregard for whether the conduct was prohibited. Thus,
an employer contemplating a decision affecting protected employees
such as a discharge from employment or reduction in the work force
may, after review, reasonably believe that the actions contemplated are
not in violation of the ADEA, i.e., that age was not a factor. Such a step
may not convince ajury that age was not, ultimately, a factor in the deci-
sion, but should suffice to establish that the employer was not careless in
its appreciation of the impact of the ADEA. Alternatively, a court may
find that while reasonable minds could differ on the evidence presented
as to whether age was a determinative factor in a particular employment
decision, nevertheless, "the thin nature of the evidence presented"
could not warrant the conclusion that the employer knew or showed
reckless disregard for whether its conduct was prohibited by the
ADEA.8 5 In sum, if the employer does not exhibit reckless disregard for
whether its actions will violate the ADEA and, in fact, takes steps to en-
82. See id. at 111; see also Whitfield v. City of Knoxville, 756 F.2d 455 (6th
Cir. 1985). For a discussion of Whii/eld, see supra note 38.
83. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 129. For a discussion of TWA's actions concerning
its transfer policy, see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
84. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 130.
85. Smith v. Consolidated Mut. Water Co., 787 F.2d 1441, 1443 (10th Cir.
1986) (evidence supported finding of ADEA violation, but not of "willful" viola-
tion); see also Gilkerson v. Toastmaster, Inc., 770 F.2d 133, 137 (8th Cir. 1985)
(neither facts nor reasonable inferences supported jury finding that violation
was "willful"); Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 770 F.2d 47, 50 (6th Cir.
1985) (evidence supported finding of violation of ADEA but did not support
finding of "willfulness").
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sure compliance, or if the evidence of willfulness is otherwise insuffi-
cient, liquidated damages will not be awarded in an individual case.
The Third Circuit has thus propagated a standard for willfulness
under the ADEA that substitutes a judicially created requirement-out-
rageousness-for the statutory requirement of willfulness. This new
standard affords an extra measure of protection for an employer in an
ADEA case by allowing a court to dispose of a verdict for liquidated
damages more easily. Now, a court need simply find an absence of out-
rageous conduct, rather than inquire whether sufficient evidence was
presented by a plaintiff such that reasonable minds could differ over the
question of the employer's knowledge or reckless disregard for whether
his conduct was in violation of the ADEA. Moreover, the proposed stan-
dard would seem to discouarge employers who are contemplating em-
ployment decisions having repercussions for ADEA-protected
employees from adopting policies involving the review of those deci-
sions. The new standard may even encourage recklessness since em-
ployers will come to believe that their behavior must be outrageous for
liquidated damages to be recoverable. 8 6 Thus, while those cases that
are now brought in the Third Circuit will not usually result in liquidated
damages, it would seem logical to conclude that if increased reckless-
ness, or decreased caution, is the result of the Dreyer decision, there will
be an increase in the volume of ADEA cases. Reconsideration by the
Third Circuit of its opinion in Dreyer would thus seem to be in order, so
that its standard for awarding liquidated damages in age discrimination
cases is in line with the standard in Thurston.
Jeffrey M. Zimskind
86. See Note, Meaning of "Willful", supra note 34, at 356-57 (reckless disre-
gard standard promotes policies of the ADEA by encouraging employees to know
more about the ADEA and the implications of their actions under the Act).
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